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HEALTH EDUCATION POLICY 1916-1926:





THIS PAPER seeks to account for the development ofa public health education policy
with respect to venereal disease during theperiod 1916-1926. Twocompeting pressure
groups, theNational Council forCombattingVenereal Disease and the Societyforthe
Prevention of Venereal Disease, defended opposing programmes; the one based on
moral education (NCCVD) and the other (SPVD) on medical prophylaxis. Many of
the interests represented by the groups and the political dimensions that they took,
were influenced by factors only very tangentially connected to health education.
Anyaccount ofthedevelopment ofpolicyinthisfieldneedsplacingin thecontextof
the early history of nineteenth-century anti-vice crusades; the role of the Army
Medical Corps during the 1914-18 war; and the bureaucratic protectionism of the
Ministry of Health personnel.
I. PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE POLICY PROCESS
Health education has occupied a singularly marginal position inthedevelopment of
British health policy; with dreary regularity ithas beenproclaimed as an essential part
of all health programmes but seldom has this seemingly ritual recognition been
reflected in any coherent long-term policy let alone any significant organizational
framework. Instead health education, despite its endorsement by most sections ofthe
medicalmarketplace, hasbeenleftto avarietyofcompetingagencies. Thegovernment
preferred toactasadiscreetbrokerinadvisinglocalauthoritieswhichoftheseagencies
had "preferred" status and also providing, with similar discretion, funds to these
agencies. This brokerage role wasconsolidated by the recognition in 1948 ofa central
co-ordinating council responsible for health education when limited funds were
guaranteed on a regular basis through local authority financing.
The early history of the development of health education has traditionally been
portrayed as alongand unitedcrusade, aninterpretation that"official" histories have
also upheld.I However the evidence available indicates that this history could be read
more accurately as a record of fierce competition between organizations with
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conflicting programmes andpolicies. The government through the Local Government
Boardandlaterthrough the MinistryofHealthplayedanactiveroleinsponsoringand
endorsingcertainpoliciesandorganizations butitavoidedatthesametimeanyradical
policy, programme, orissuewhichmight, intheirview, bepoliticallycontentious. This
inevitably meant that no positive health education policy was developed, rather only
an abundance ofrhetoric. It also meant that those agencies which did receive support
tailored their programmes to safeguard their revenue, similarly those bidding for
support had little success iftheydeveloped programmes whichchallenged theexisting
administrative framework or the prevailing consensus on health care.
InthePolitical Sciencefieldthereisaconsiderablebodyofliteratureontheinfluence
ofpressure groups on policy-making in Britain, both historically and contemporarily.
One debate revolves around the contention that modern liberal democracies have
evolved a policy-making process which allows for the maximum expression ofa wide
range ofinterests through competing pressure groups. This is contested by opposing
viewswhich maintainthatthestyleofpressure grouppolitics specificallyfavours those
interests and persons which are already well placed within the society's power
structure; hence pressure groups represent a competition of only already dominant
and powerful interests.2 The extent to which governments are able to balance these
powerful interest groups against each other or by the withdrawal of patronage and
funds is much debated and documented.3 The case beingconsidered here supports the
viewthatcompetingpressuregroups arenotnecessarilygiventhesamelegitimation, or
access to decision-makers. The barriers that prevent access ofone group and facilitate
the influence of another are discrete and not readily acknowledged by the
administrators, particularly when negotiations and interactions between the groups
and the administration are kept private and informal and are removed from public
accountability and scrutiny.
In this case although two particular organized groups are the main focus of the
study, there were nevertheless many other interests involved in the conflict between
them, and therefore this account strays outside of the conventional area of pressure
group studies. This is necessary in order to locate this particular dispute in the context
of the emerging health service.
This aspect of health care cannot be excluded from the general monopolizing
strategies ofthe medical profession. Doctors played a significant part both directly in
the voluntary bodies and indirectly through their sponsorship of them; they also
exercized a powerful influence through their position on significant consultancy
committees and directly through their spokesmen in the Ministry. Many of these
apparently "lay" voluntary organizations were in fact stalking horses ofthe medical
profession and the composition of their executive committees reflect this.
A conventional pressure group model also has limitations in so far as it would tend
to exclude many of the unstructured activities and programmes of early health
campaigning societies. Their membership was often changeable, and probably
2 B. Guy Peters, 'Insiders and outsiders, the politics of pressure group influence on bureaucracy',
Administration and Society, 1977, 9: no. 2.
3 Ibid.
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dependent more upon notions offashion rather than upon differences in policy. The
modeofearlyorganizationandpropagandacampaigns wascharacteristic ofacrusade
concerned with stimulating a mass following behind a moral theme of "hygiene".4
Finally, anyanalysisin terms ofpressuregrouppolitics would in thisparticularcase
need supplementing with an account ofthe role played by government agencies and
personnel in directly influencing the programmes and politics ofcertain groups. This
role varied from involvement through discreet and informal meetings to rather more
direct methods of cutting off funds and withdrawing co-operation. There is
considerable evidence to suggest that Whitehall protectionism influenced the
programmesofhealtheducation groups. Thisareaofdepartmental andadministrative
politicsisawebofconflictinginterests, andinaccountingfortheearlyhistoryofhealth
education this aspect of the policy process would need to be closely examined.
One particular issue which provided a focus for the conflict of interests of health
education groups, doctors, the military, government, and the church was that of
"prophylaxis".5 It has featured in health education on many occasions, in the early
days ofthis century it appeared in the venereal disease propaganda; more recently it
was to be found in the birth control campaigns of this decade. It has often been
contended that moral arguments have predominated in health education, and that
non-medical personnel by their involvement have trivialized and devalued this part of
health care. The implication of this argument is that by excluding the medical
profession from control in this sector of health care, health education has been
rendered ineffective.6
This paper deals with the interests and conflicts involved in the development of
public health education. Theview that this rested on a struggle between moralists and
medics is rejected; instead a rather more complicated pattern is proposed which
features overlapping interest groups, professional monopolising, secular crusading,
and administrative politics.
II. THE ABOLITIONIST CRUSADE
Certainly the British crusaders for public hygiene never managed to organize
themselves on such a large scale and with such effect as the American purity leagues,
and the American anti-vice campaigns. By comparison they remained a divided
collection of separate groups sponsoring diverse issues although they appeared to
share a vague ideological commitment to the values of"moral and physical hygiene"
particularly endorsingtheories whichlinked thedefence ofEmpire with the defence of
Race. The active and not purely nominal leadership was dominated by upper middle
class women, churchmen, and members ofthe peerage. It is easy to see why they have
beenareadytargetforthecriticismthattheyrepresented areactionary outpostofclass
morality blocking the development ofmedical approaches to public health. However,
4 J. R. Gusfield, Symbolic crusade, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1969.
5 Prophylaxisliterallymeans thepreventive treatment ofdisease, butin thiscase itcame to have a more
specific meaning ofmethods that could be used (disinfectants - potassium permanganate, calomel, etc.)
immediately after intercourse to ensure that infection did not occur. There are a few occasions when the
sheathisalsodefinedasaprophylacticmeasureagainstvenerealdisease. Butitgenerallymeantsomeformof
immediate disinfection.
6 See, for instance, T. Rosebury, Microbes andmorals, New York, Viking Press, 1971.
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this view may well need modifying when the movement is seen in the context ofthe
range of disputes that it engaged in with the military-medical establishment.
Beardsley, in his examination of the documents of the Imperial War Conference,
July 1918, dealing with the policies of the allies towards venereal disease and
prostitution, raises the military-medical dimension.7 The evidence suggests that the
issue was considered to be ofno mean importance by the Americans and Dominions
andthattheywereappalledatthefailureoftheBritishtotackletheproblem. Beardsley
applauds the strong line taken by the Americans on venereal diseasecontrol which he
attributes to the influence of the American anti-vice crusades, whilst he holds the
National Council for Combatting Venereal Disease (NCCVD) responsible for the
lethargy ofthe British: "High ranking clergymen and upper class moralists who took
thelead in the anti-vicecrusade downplayed the medical approach to venerealdisease
with the result that the clinics and prophylaxis never got the attention they did in the
U.S.A."8 There is however a far wider background to these differences in policy on
venereal disease control, a background over which Beardsley quickly glosses with his
remark that before 1916 there had been no public discussion of venereal disease in
Britain. Itseemslikelythat itistheveryexistence ofalongperiod ofpublicdiscussion,
Royal Commissions, and protest movements which might account for the position
taken by the British authorities on venereal diseases. There was, and still is,
considerable debate as to the extent ofvenereal diseases in the population during this
period. Official figures are extremely unreliable; a point acknowledged by the Royal
Commission of 1916 in its conclusion that the rate ofinfection in the British military
was approximately thirty per cent.
Legislation to control venereal disease in the armed forces was first passed in 1864
withtheContagiousDiseasesActs. Althoughtheywereconfinedintheirapplicationto
military and naval bases and their surrounding areas, they were aimed directly at the
control ofprostitution in the beliefthat regulating and inspecting prostitutes was the
most effective method in controlling venereal disease itself; i.e., to control what was
perceived ofas the "source ofinfection". Prostitutes in military areas were subject to
surveillance and arrest, compulsory examination and treatment, and even
imprisonment or banishment from the area. The identification ofprostitutes and the
enforcement ofthe Acts was left to a morals policing system which at the local level
provided ample scope for blackmail, corruption, and victimization.9
AseriesofsupplementaryandextendedActswerepassedin 1868 and 1869 andthere
was considerable enthusiasm in the Privy Council for extending them to cover the
wholecountry. Infactthe ForeignOffice wascommissioned todo asurveyonvenereal
disease control. Sir John Simon (Medical Officer to the Privy Council) arranged for
this extensive survey to be made. Requests were sent to all British ambassadors to
submit reports on the policies ofvenereal disease control that were followed in their
country ofposting. Simon was ofthe opinion that such an extension to the Acts was
7 E. Beardsley, 'Allied against sin: American and British responses to venereal disease inWorldWar I',
Med Hist., 1976, 20: 189-202.
8 Ibid.
9 A studyofthese Acts and their implementation is given by B.-J.Walkowitz, 'We are not beasts ofthe
field', Feminist Studies, summer 1973.
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only possible if the Bill was well drafted and based on an impressive collection of
data.10 However opposition was becoming more vocal and the Royal Commission of
1870 came out in favour of a reduction in the powers of routine detention and
inspection whilst at the same time allowing the Acts to remain on the statute books.
Those opposing the Acts, known as the Abolitionists, incorporated a wide range of
interest groups, most strongly featured among them was Josephine Butler's National
Association, a campaign against "State regulated vice". Josephine Butler saw the
Abolitionist movement as founded upon a range ofpropositions which allowed it to
have a broad-based appeal. The eight-point protest which was first published in the
Daily News 1 January 1870, (endorsed, among others, by Florence Nightingale,
Harriet Martineau, and Mary Carpenter) held that: (1) There had been no proper
discussion oftheActsinthepressorinParliament. (2) Forwomentheyremovedevery
guarantee of personal security since they put their reputation, freedom, and person
absolutely in the power of the police. (3) The law should define clearly any offence
whichitsoughttopunishandthisitfailedtodo. (4) Itwasunjusttopunishthesexwho
werethevictimsofviceandleaveunpunished the sexwhowere themaincause. (5) The
path to evil was made more easy. (6) The measures violated the feelings of women
whose sense ofshamewasnotwhollylost, andfurtherbrutalizedthosewho were most
abandoned. (7) The disease would never be removed bylegislation. (8) Theconditions
of the disease were moral not physical.
Aprogrammeofpresscampaigns, publicmeetings, lobbyingatelectionsinmarginal
constituencies, and international tours ensured considerable support for the
Abolitionists, and although theyfailed to gettheActs repealed until 1886, they had by
1880 made them inoperable by securing vitiating administrative changes in their
application.11
The Abolitionist crusade embraced a considerable range of beliefs and attitudes
towards venereal disease, its control and the role of government in devising public
health programmes. Many of the attitudes were clear examples of Victorian moral
selectivity; they chose to ignore institutional cruelty and violence but focused instead
onpersonalsexualmorality. Theyrefusedtoacceptthepossibilitythatso-called"vice"
was often the only means of securing clean living conditions, good food, and good
clothing.12 At the same time they invoked their same class morality to condemn the
medical profession: "Thepurification ofthemedicalprofession was hoped forand the
exposure and defeat ofthosedeadlymaterialist doctrines . . . which togetherwith the
dogmatismanddespotismofcertaindoctors hasbegun toexercise so fatal an influence
over our legislative councils."'13
The definition of the crusade as a woman's issue was also a significant feature in
recruitment; even ifin later years Josephine Butler tended to play down this aspect.
Certainly Victor Hugo characterized the movement as a sexiststruggle, wherein "laws
are made by men to tyrannise over women".14 Josephine Butler's feminism was more
10 J. B.Post, 'AForeignOfficesurveyofvenerealdiseaseandprostitutioncontrol 1869-1870', Med Hist.,
1978, 22: 327-334.
11 Josephine Butler, Personal reminiscences ofa great crusade, new ed., London, H. Marshall, 1910.
12 R. Pearsall, The worm in the bud, London, Pelican Books, 1971.
13 Butler, op. cit., note 11 above.
14 Ibid.
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oblique, she was more impressed with thewayin whichuppermiddleclasswomen had
become involved in an issue "which led them to work actively on behalfoftheir less
fortunate sisters", it was on these grounds ofphilanthropy that she championed the
solidarity ofthe women ofthe country.'5 The focus on the civil liberties aspect ofthe
legislation was always paramount and provided for some strident attacks on policing
in general; it was a characteristic stance of the upper middle classes to oppose state
policing schemes which they saw as a form ofcontinental tyranny. Josephine Butler
indulges this feeling in a vitriolic description ofher meeting with Lecour, Head ofthe
Parismoralspolice: "Hiscountenanceistomerepulsive, hehasafixedsmilethatofthe
hypocrite, he is a shallow actor, an acrobat, a stage manager . . . intoxicated with the
sense of power."16
InaccountingforthefinalrepealoftheActsitismostlikelythatthemainarguments
werethatthelegislation wassimplyinoperabledue toboth thefailureofmagistrates to
convictandthepoliceto prosecute. TheAbolitionists wereinstrumental inmakingthe
debate public and exhibiting the government as responsible for immoral legislation.'7
Interpretations ofthe Abolitionist crusade have varied from that ofan early feminist
movement to one ofcynical self-interest.
In his study of the Child Saving Movement in Illinois, U.S.A., Platt identifies a
similarlycontradictory motivation: "The assumption that women weremorally purer
than men, better capable of altruism and self sacrifice, was the core of the myth of
domesticity against which the feminists were in revolt . . . feminist and antifeminist
assumptions seemed curiously to coincide . . ."18 There is evidence ofacontinuity of
this crusade through to the 1930s in thecampaign against the popularly called "white
slavetrade", anissue moreaccuratelydescribedbythe LeagueofNations as oneofthe
international traffic in prostitution.19 What is clear is that the programme of
oppositionwasabroad oneandthatwidesupportwasgainedpreciselybecauseofthis;
so that to characterize the Abolitionists as movingpurely on the moral issue ofsexual
promiscuity is to ignore a wide section of its activities. It is this history of the early
attempts to deal with venereal disease which Beardsley ignores and so enables him to
make an unhappy comparison between the British and American policies.
III. MILITARY RESPONSES TO V.D.
Beardsley characterizes the American anti-vice crusades as being primarily a "mass
interest seeking an outlet for heightened nationalism",20 although as a movement it
probably had its roots in earlier moralitycampaigns. Heclearly identifies its activities
during the 1914-18 war as being closely linked with the military and the legislature.
Whilst on the one hand campaigning vigorously for the abolition of all regulated
brothels, they nevertheless defended fiercely the other aspects of the Regulationist
policies - namely the forced imprisonment and treatment ofall prostitutes or women
'5 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 An account ofacomparable regulationist policy and the abolitionist opposition inGermany is given
by: R.J. Evans, 'Prostitution, stateandsociety inImperialGermany', PastandPresent,February 1976, no.
70.
18 A. Platt, 'The child savers', Annals ofthe American Academy, January 1969, no. 381, pp. 21-38.
19 Proceedings ofImperial Social Hygiene Congress, 1929.
20 Beardsley, op. cit., note 7 above.
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suspectedofhavingvenerealdisease. AmericanPurity Leaguesoperatedlocalvigilante
groups, either hustling suspected women out of town or intimidating and reporting
them. These activities were backed up by legislation in many states coming from the
publichealthdepartments. Accordingto Beardsley, theIllinois BoardofPublicHealth
"hadpowertohospitalise anywomanthought tobeinfectedandifsherefusedthenthe
Boardposted alargeplacard on herhomereading'suspected V.D.' "21 The U.S. army
also reflected this medical policy in its regulations that any soldier who failed to take
treatmentforvenerealdiseasecouldbecourtmartialledandimprisoned, andwenteven
further in making the use of prophylactic measures compulsory (sheaths and
disinfectants). It was this strong line taken by the Americans which was so vigorously
defended at the Imperial War conference.
The British approach to the control ofvenereal disease among the troops was the
Defence ofthe RealmAct No. 40D.22 These measures wereconsideredderisory by the
Americans and Canadians, who protested that the British were failing to take the
matter seriously and were too strongly influenced by moralist groups who refused to
sanction theuseofmedical treatments. The Defence ofthe RealmAct(40D)provoked
a considerable amount of domestic opposition, and arguments from the old
Abolitionist crusade were rehearsed again. The Cabinet was not minded to introduce
dissent at a time when it was promoting blind patriotic support ofthe military. Haig
wrotetotheSecretaryofWar,alsoopposedtoanyRegulationistpolicies, whichhesaw
as an indication of trivial concern with fornication in the army.23
Whilst the generals in the British army may have taken a laissez-faire approach to
venereal disease oreven apragmatic tolerance ofregulated brothels, themedicalcorps
in the army took a strong line ofattack on the government for its failure to develop a
treatment and prevention programme. They saw the issue as one of medical and
military importance and enthusiastically supported the American policies; they were
also similarly dismissive of the NCCVD which they accused of "hedging between
deference to sentiment and the raison d'etre of their existence - namely controlling
V.D."24 In a paper read to the Royal Institute of Public Health, Colonel Adami
(surgeon to the Canadian forces) outlined the medical-military response to venereal
disease as he saw it: the compulsory inspection and treatment of all prostitutes,
compulsory treatment of all those infected, emergency treatment centres in all city
centres, record sheets to be kept of all infected persons, military personnel to be
dockedhalf-pay ifinfected, andcommanders to bedismissed iftherates ofinfection in
troops under their command rose beyond certain levels, the establishment ofspecial
hospitals, mobile clinics, and the provision ofprophylactic "packets" to all troops to
disinfect themselves after sexual intercourse.25
21 Ibid.
22 Defence ofthe Realm Act, Section (40D), March 1918 held that: "No woman who is suffering from
V.D. in acommunicable form shall have sexual intercoursewith anymemberofthe armed forces or anyof
H.M. allies, or solicit or invite anymember to have sexual intercourse with her. A womanchargedwith an
offence under this regulation shall if so be required be remanded for not less than a week for medical
examination as a summary offence."
23 Beardsley, op. cit., note 7 above.
24 Letter from Senior Surgeon Charles P. Child to Br. med J., 1919, ii: 797-798.
25 J. G. Adami, 'The policy of the ostrich', ibid., 1919, i: 98-101.
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Thearmywasprimarilyconcerned aboutthewastageofmanpowerthatoccurredas
a result ofvenereal disease infection. Theywanted to sustain theirdivisions in thefield
at the highest numerical strength and they weretherefore loath to have soldiers absent
for long periods being treated back at base. This led to the development in the British
army of short intensive treatments with salvarsan and mercury, often resulting in
serious and unpleasant side-effects, ranging from convulsions to jaundice.26 The
American expeditionary forces took this one stage further and administered
treatments at the front line by urologists attached to the units; they even developed
special venereal labour companies for those undergoing treatments since they wanted
to ensure that venereal disease was not made a convenient excuse to escape military
duties.27
What was apparent in the debates over policy on venereal disease was that the
military were capable of introducing a programme of control that was simply not
administratively or politically possible in the civilian population. The Americans on
the other hand had secured strong civilian support through their anti-vice crusades
which had totally subordinated all issues ofcivil rights to themedical-treatment ethic;
in so doing they defended the extension of both police powers and public health
controls. The British militarywas stilldominated byaclassleadershipwhichdefended
thebeliefthatarmymoralewascontingentonsexualactivity, theywerethereforeloath
toallowcivilian interferenceinshuttingdownbrothelsandwerequiteintolerantofany
moral arguments on sexualpromiscuity. Howeverdespitetheattitude oftheirgenerals
the British Army Medical Corps instituted practices of treatment and prevention
which ensured the widespread adoption ofa medical approach rather than one based
on regulations ofsocialcontrol. Itwas in the army thatself-administered disinfectants
were first provided in Britain and it was this so-called "packet system" which was to
become a central part of the debate in health education in the next decade.
The term "prophylactic packet" meant little more than an easily portable
medication that could be used by the individual himself, the materials varied in
composition from "Metchnikoff's Formula" based on calomel and carbolic acid to
"Condy's Fluid" made up of potassium permanganate.28
What can be seen emerging at this time is the particular issue, i.e. the role of
prophylaxis in the treatment of venereal disease as focused around the "packet
system"; this became a contentious issue because it involved a variety of interest
groupswhoweredefendingvaluesandprogrammeswhichwereoftenonlytangentially
connected with the prevention of venereal disease.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMBATTING VENEREAL DISEASE
The National Council for Combatting Venereal Disease (NCCVD) was founded as
a direct outgrowth of the 1916 Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases; in fact the
organization wasexpressly tailored to fitthepattern ofthe"independent society" that
was recommended in the final report.29 Lord Sydenham as the chairman ofthe Royal
26 T. F. Ritchie, 'The treatment ofvenereal disease in armies', Int. J. pubt Hlth, 1921, 2: 61.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 TheinauguralmeetingoftheNCCVDwasheld 11 November 1914,but thiswasaprovisionalmeeting
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Commission wasinvited to becomepresident oftheCouncil, andmost ofthemembers
of the Commission also accepted the invitation to join. The NCCVD saw its role as
"givingeffect to thepolicies recommended in the Report and actingasan independent
society capable of stimulating the powers that be . . .".30 The report itself was
surprisingly humdrumand avoided recommendations on any ofthecontentious issues
ofnotification, detention, compulsory treatment, or prophylaxis; instead the general
conclusions were that prevention should be anchored on a policy of widespread
education and propaganda, and it was precisely in the control ofthis aspect ofpolicy
that the NCCVD saw its opportunity for development and government financing.
The Local Government Board issued its directives on new procedures for treating
venereal disease to local authorities inJuly 1916. They weremainlyconcernedwith the
provision of clinics and other out-patient facilities and with the prescription of
salvarsan as medication; however a supplementary duty was also placed upon local
authorities to educate the public in the causes and treatment ofvenereal diseases and
generally to promote health habits. There was aprovision thatseventy-five percent of
the funds for these services would be provided by the Treasury. This system of
financing was to prove extremely advantageous to the role of an independent
organization liketheNCCVD, sinceitmeantthattheymerelyhadtonegotiatewiththe
medicalcommittee oftheBoardofLocalGovernment inordertosecureforthemselves
an accredited status and a direct exchequer grant. Ifthe financing ofhealth education
had been left to the local authorities, then individual bargaining arrangements and
contracts would have had to bedrawn up. It was an arrangementwhichalso suited the
Board; asNewsholme (ChiefMedical Officer) noted in a minute to Long(President of
the Local Government Board), the grants to the local authorities werepreferable since
they were only seventy-five per cent, but if they were made to the Insurance
Committees they would have to have been one hundred per cent. Since this time the
arrangements for the financing of health education have been an arena for political
bargaining. Itwas also significant that fromthe beginning the educational aspects ofa
public health campaign should have been excluded from the usual budgeting
arrangements ofpublic health services, and be separated from the other financing of
health services through Insurance Committees.3' Since the sums involved, when
and thesociety was notofficially convened until March 1916. Hence there is a reference in paragraph 225 of
the conclusions of the Royal Commission which specifically mentions the NCCVD as the agency which
should give its imprimatur to the distribution ofhealth education and propaganda materials.
30 'The report of the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases', Br. med J., 1916, i: 385-387.
31 The local insurance committees continued theirposition regarding health education and propaganda
through to 1946. A memorandum from Robinson (permanent secretary to the Ministry) to the Minister
(26.7.32) highlights this: "Insurance committees as a separate institution are an old story and owed their
originandinparticulartheiranomalouspowers inregard tohealtheducationandpropaganda toMr. Lloyd
George'swellknownantagonism to the LocalGovernment Boardandall itsworks.They areinfactawaste
ofmoneyandweinduced the RoyalCommission of1926-27 to recommend theirabolitionandreplacement
by theHealthCommittees ofthecounties andcountyboroughs. But theapproved societieshave amajority
in the Insurance Committees and resisted the abolition backed by the doctors who do not fancy coming
under a healthcommittee which is apt to resistco-option ofnon-electedmembers. The localauthority men
wouldnotplaybecausethemoneyisLocalHealthInsurance Fundmoneyandtheyhelditwronginprinciple
that acommittee ofa LocalAuthority should haveresponsibility without Rate Interest. Between themthey
were too much for us so we had to go on as we were." (Ref: PRO.MH55/2).
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totalled across the country, were far from small it was a sizeable budget for an
independent and publicly unaccountable society to handle.32
The NCCVD managed to ensure through deputations to Long that they would
receive not only financial backing but also government endorsemnent for their policy.
Thesemeetings tookplace beforetheNCCVD hadproduced anyclearorrecognizable
policy orprogramme, itwas ineffect ablankcheque ofsupport that theygainedat this
stage. This remarkable success may be attributable to the fact that the Board was
simply over-burdened with the administrative problems ofsetting up the new venereal
disease centres and co-ordinating them with existing treatment schemes. When the
irate Medical Officer of Health of York wrote to Newsholme in November 1916
protesting that the Board had not provided any educational or propaganda circulars
and posters for the Local Authorities to use, Newsholme quickly spotted an
opportunity to hand this work over to the NCCVD.33 Long seemed to be in a great
hurry to implement the new treatment schemes and brooked no criticism of the new
regulations that the department issued. One consequence of this haste was that the
British Medical Association were decidedly annoyed that they were not given time to
submit their own analysis of the new treatment and propaganda schemes.34
At their second annual conference the NCCVD were able to report considerable
expansion oftheiractivities; theyhaddeveloped an identifiableprogramme ofleaflets,
lectures, posterspromotingearly treatment forvenereal disease, and the freediagnosis
clinics. They had also secured official recognition for the establishment of some
fourteen branches of the organization, and were engaged in international tours and
"fact finding" expeditions. A message from the King was sent to the conference
expressingcongratulations ontheworkoftheCouncil. This royal message wasquoted
ritualistically at every subsequent conference. They took a guarded position with
regard toprophylaxis, findingit: ". . . Undesirable fortheCouncil to takestepsin the
direction ofacampaign infavour ofprophylactic teaching . . . unwise forthe Council
to go further than the Royal Commission. A distinction can be drawn between
prophylaxis and early treatment. . 35
For the duration ofthe war the majority ofthe NCCVD's work was concentrated
upon the civilian population but they quickly saw an area for expansion with the
comingofdemobilization; they weretherefore highly active inpublicizing thepossible
effect of demobilization on the incidence of venereal disease. In response to this
pressure the Local Government Board issued V.D. Circular 19 calling upon all local
authorities to establish treatment centres in every town with a population of over
20,000 and to appoint full-time venereal disease officers. Venereal disease was
therefore made a priority area for public health education and yet there was still a
strong resistance to promoting any form of self-disinfection as either treatment or
32 From 1918-1929 theNCCVD had aminimum annualgovernment grant of£10,000, and some years it
rose to £15,000. (NCCVD Minutes). According to Harley Williams (A century ofpublic health in Britain,
London, 1932) the sum in 1916 was£16,250 and itwassomething ofaprecedent in that it was thefirst time
the Treasury had paid a grant to a private organization for propaganda purposes.
33 PRO/MH55/534. Medical Officer of Health (York) letter to Newsholme, 9 November 1916.
34 Br. med J., 1916, ii: 266-267.
35 Annual Report ofNCCVD, 1916.
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prophylaxis. The NCCVD's policy on prophylaxis hardened into one of complete
opposition reflectingwhattheyjudged wasamoral andpolitical consensus. The moral
argument held thatprophylaxis only served to legitimize "irregular" andpromiscuous
sex and thus actively promoted immorality by removing the natural penalties
associated with promiscuity. A Ministry of Health interdepartmental committee,
reporting in 1919, stressed the political opposition in its statement that the issuing of
"packets for self-disinfection" was neither desirable nor practicable and that the
priority should be given to early treatment and moral teaching.
It was probably the expansion of the services for treating venereal disease which
drew attention increasingly to the inadequacies of the promotional and educational
policy ofthe NCCVD. The expansion led the NCCVD to increase its recruitment of
lecturers and staff officers, and these came mainly from the military after
demobilization where they had had experience with both treatment and prevention
techniques based on "packets". They were therefore severely critical ofthe failure of
the NCCVD to legitimize this system or any other simple prophylactic measure.
Wansey Bayly, the Secretary to the SPVD, recounts in his memoirs that his first work
after demobilization was with the NCCVD as a lecturer: "To my surprise, I found all
referencetodisinfectionwastaboo, and thatemployment as alecturerwasconditional
on agreement not to mention or recommend personal disinfection as a method of
combatting venereal disease."36
The NCCVD's policy was reinforced by the quite strict legal restrictions embodied
in the 1917 venereal disease legislation which made it an offence to advertise remedies
for diseases arising from sexual intercourse. There were sporadic prosecutions under
Section I ofthe Act and penalties ranged from £200 fines in Newcastle to six months'
imprisonment in Scotland. The net effect of this was that local authorities were
unwilling to risk prosecution by allowing their employees or their agents to promote
self-disinfection for use as a cure for venereal disease or as a prevention against it.
Ironically enough, it was as a result ofpressure from the British Medical Association
that the government had become involved in regulating advertising in this field.37
V. CONFLICT AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF VENEREAL
DISEASE (SPVD)
During 1919and 1920asignificantnumberofdoctors, particularly ex-armydoctors,
voicedtheircriticismsoftheNCCVDinthepopularpressand inmedicaljournals. The
British MedicalJournal became a regular forum for the debate on prophylaxis, along
with the letters page of The Times. In October 1919 the Society for the Prevention of
Venereal Disease(SPVD) was formed under thechairmanship ofLordWilloughby de
Broke, its aim being to promote the dissemination ofknowledge ofthe prevention of
venerealdisease, i.e. topromotetheprohibited "packetsystem". Theygaveshortshrift
to the morality arguments of the NCCVD with some hard-nosed realism:"...
Human nature being what it is, we cannot enforce sexual continence why then should
36 H. Wansey Bayly, Triple challenge: war, whirligigs and windnills, London, Hutchinson, [n.d.].
37 A. Fessler, 'Advertisments in the treatment ofV.D. and the social history ofV.D.', Br. J. vener. Dis.,
1949, 25.
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we not do our utmost to minimise the evil results which do often follow from sexual
irregularity . ."38 The SPVD were quite explicit about the kind ofpropaganda and
packet system theywanted to promote, they suggestedthatnotices should beplaced in
all public lavatories to the effect: ". . . Every time you have sexual intercourse with a
womanwhoisnotyourwifeyouruntheriskofvenerealdisease. Youcanavoiddisease
in oneway. Ineverypublicwaterclosetis anautomaticmachine, byputtingapennyin
the slot youwill obtain apacket with the necessary material. Apply them according to
the instructions and you will be safe . . .".39 Local authorities were to provide these
packets which were to be made up ofpotassium permanganate andcalomel ointment.
Throughout 1920 the SPVD stepped up its campaign in the press against the
NCCVD, and was particularly successful in recruiting Dr. Wilson, the medical
correspondent to The Times, as a member ofthe Society. The lobbying ofWilloughby
inthe HouseofLordswasalso instrumental in gainingthesupportofthepressbarons,
Northcliffe and Burnham, and the Editor of the Morning Post, who was invited to
become President of the Society. The campaign was not merely critical of the
ineffectivenessoftheNCCVDbutmounted acasefortakingoveritsgovernment grant
and abolishingthe 1917V.D. Act; thisleditincreasingly tofocusitscriticism upon the
government. Withthemajorityofthepress, themedicaljournals, and sizeable factions
in Parliament defending the SPVD policy of prophylaxis, it was an extraordinarily
entrenched position that the Ministry of Health took.
By 1920 George Newman (ChiefMedical Officer at the Ministry ofHealth) appears
to have acknowledged the shortcomings ofthe NCCVD despite his own commitment
to them. Newman as MedicalOfficer ofHealthfrom 1919-1939, andArthur Robinson
as permanent Secretary at the Ministry from 1920-1935, together favoured the moral
philosophy of the NCCVD, a patronage that they clearly acknowledged in their
departmental correspondence. Together they established a departmental orthodoxy
on healtheducation inthisfield that seemedimpregnable and must in part account for
the endurance of the NCCVD.
At the beginning of 1920, Addison, then Minister ofHealth, was beginning to lack
confidence in the propaganda ofthe NCCVD and was contemplating shifting policy
towards the SPVD to favour the packet system. Newman in a position paper outlined
the problem with a frank recognition: ". . . There can be little doubt that early
disinfection isformenpracticable andeffective, thequestionisnotofscientificfactbut
social and administrative practice . . .".40
He argued that the endorsement ofa packet system would be seen as the Ministry
encouraging illicit sex, yet on the other hand he acknowledged that: "We must either
putintothehandsofpersons themselves some meansoftreatingthemselves orprovide
properplaces forpeople to bedisinfected."41 The ministerial response was to cool the
issue and another interdepartmental committee was commissioned to review the
prevalence ofvenereal disease and the effectiveness oftreatment. Addison was at this
time also generally questioning the policy ofsponsoring voluntary bodies to provide
38 A. C. Magian, letter to Br. med J., 1919, ii: 797.
39 E. T. Burke, letter to ibid., 1919, ii: 509.
40 PRO. MH55/179. Chief Medical Officer to Secretary to Minister 1920.
41 Ibid.
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healthpropaganda; hewanted tolookatthewholefield ofhealthpropagandasincehe
felt there was a great deal of waste of money in administrative costs.42 In 1920 the
Ministry ofHealth seriouslyconsidered thepossibility ofcreatingaseparate branch of
the department to take control of propaganda; however Addison was personally
opposed to thedepartment undertaking any form ofpopularpropagandawork which
in his eyes would be directed at the masses: ". . . it would be fatal ifthe Ministry of
Health were to appear to be endeavouring to put the individual member of the
population in leading strings."43 Aftergingerly examining the possibilities ofcreating
a smallpublicity and propaganda section to coverhealth and housingissues, Addison
finallyrejected theplans onthegrounds thattheCabinethadacommitment tomaking
economies inthefieldofpublicityandalthoughtheMinistryofHealthhadagoodcase
for sustaining a propaganda budget it was not prudent to argue the point.44
Newman had persistently defended the work of the NCCVD during these
discussions and even went so far as to claim that the Ministry would be incapable of
doingtheworkthemselves. ItmustbenotedthattheMinistryhadtofindonlyseventy-
five per cent ofthe costs ofthe propaganda work, the remainder being found by the
localauthorities; whereasitwasresponsible foronehundredpercentofthecostsofthe
venereal disease treatment and diagnosis centres. It is extremely difficult in retrospect
to make a calculation ofthe differential costs to the Ministry. Strangely there do not
appearto have been any hardcalculations submitted to buttresseitherpolicy; thiswas
avoidedbyeachsidefocusingthedebateonquestionsofefficacyofmethodratherthan
oncosts. Anydiscussion oftheelementofcostsaccruingto theMinistryseemed to run
up against Robinson's clear and total opposition to the SPVD policy on any
grounds.45
Since the Ministry was not going to develop any alternative policy of its own,
Newman was despatched to have unofficial meetings with representatives from both
societies. At this time it became clear that there was increasing dissatisfaction within
the NCCVD itselfand inJuly 1920 six senior members ofthe executive committee, all
doctors, resigned tojoin the SPVD as aprotest against the NCCVD attitudes towards
prophylaxis and its failure to make any scientific enquiries into venereal disease. This
wasaseriousblowtotheNCCVDandNewmanwasobligedtoremark tothe Minister
that most ofthe NCCVD "were impossible people", and that: ". . . I am not without
hope that on some basis I can bring a little nearer together the quarrelling doctors
though I cannot hope to do the same with the Bishops and the Ladies . . . ss.46
Addison, Newman, and Robinson refused to accept any formal deputations from
the SPVD, hoping instead to forge an alliance between them informally and so to
dampen the hostility. But it was their refusal to accept a delegation that spurred the
SPVD to take theircampaign into the press again, they also used their support in the
RHouse ofLords to keepup a running sore ofpolitical andpersonal attack onAddison.
The NCCVD was drawn into the public debate in the press, but the new president
42 PRO. MH55/27. 4 May 1920. Conference on propaganda.
43 PRO. MH55/27. 29 July 1920. Reconvened conference on propaganda.
44 Ibid.
45 PRO. MH55/179. February 1921. Note on L. A. draft leaflet.
46 PRO. MH55/179. Newman to Minister, 14 February 1921.
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(Lord Gorel) was more actively engaged in lobbying the Ministry; he wanted either
unequivocal support in public or otherwise a commission to adjudicate between the
two societies. Addision had a good personal relationship with Gorel, and although
they met informally Gorel was told that he could publicly announce that the Minister
had given his personal approval to the work of the NCCVD.47
VI. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AS SPONSOR AND ADJUDICATOR
A position paper to the Cabinet in 1921 made it clear that the Departmental policy
was unmoved bythe SPVD: ". . . ifofficial recognition were given to the advocacy of
self-disinfection for civilians, I think that it is certain that the moral sense of the
community would be outraged and in my opinion it is doubtful whether we should be
justified in taking any steps which might have this result even if medical opinion
unanimously called for that particular measure . .."48 The Minister was clear in a
memo to Robinson thattheyhadgoodgroundstofighttheSPVD policybut"ifwe are
ambiguous or take refuge in generalities we shall be accused of shilly-shallying".49
However, on analysis the "good grounds" turned out to be merely a feeling that
prophylaxis did not meet the "evil".
Newman was more sceptical ofthis stance and recognized that ifthe NCCVD were
to continue to receive departmental endorsement then they would need to define their
policy more clearly and that they would need official vindication. He was therefore in
favour ofGorel's plan to have an official.committee to examine the conflict, a move
whichwouldalsohaveabatedcriticismoftheDepartment. Gorelwasonlyenthusiastic
to have the committee ifit was notpresided over by adoctor. Newman, with a similar
concern forinstitutional bias, suggested theidealcommitteewouldbetheConsultancy
Committee of the Ministry. His thinking was that a thorough reappraisal of
propaganda andeducation fromwithin the Ministrywould allowit to escape from the
commitment that they had towards the NCCVD as a result ofthe 1916 Commission
and hence they "could start again not entirely afresh but without some of the
embarrassing commitments under which'we labour".50 For this reason Newman was
emphaticthat the idea ofanenquiryshould be seen tocome from theDepartment and
not from the NCCVD. After Addison's resignation in April 1921, he was replaced by
Sir Alfred Mond who was less sensitive to Newman's diplomacy and took the rather
bluntapproachthatthematterwasamedicaloneandthereforeshouldbedealtwithby
a Consultancy Committee composed of doctors and that since its report would be
confidential the government would not be embarrassed by it. However, when Lord
Dawson was nominated as the chairman of the Consultancy Committee, Newman
realized thatthis solution wouldsatisfy no one, sinceDawsonwasalsoPresident ofthe
NCCVD.
Mond had little sympathy with the dispute, he admitted51 that he himself "had a
secret sympathy with the scientific basis of the prevention doctrine, but could never
47 PRO. MH55/179. Minutes ofmeeting of Lord Gorel and Minister, 2 March 1921.
48 PRO. MH55/179. MacLahan to Cabinet, 9 March 1921.
49 PRO. MH55/179. Minister to Robinson, 20 April 1921.
50 PRO. MH55/181. Newman to Robinson, 5 December 1921.
51 PRO. MH55/181. Minutes ofmeeting ofRobinson, Newman, Dawson, and Minister, 16 December
1921.
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withstand the opposition that would be aroused if he adopted it officially." He
wondered if the time had arrived for taking a bold policy, but discounted it on the
grounds that the SPVD had a perverted view ofsex. Another "bold" policy he toyed
with was thecuttingoffofthe NCCVD'sfunds, butagain rejected it on administrative
grounds. He threatened the NCCVD that if there was any more public conflict the
Cabinet would get sick ofthewholeissueand abandon all thevenerealdiseasework.52
Newman managed to sell his plan ofan independent Committee ofEnquiry to the
Minister and it was set up under Lord Trevethin. Although it was styled as a private
committee it did receive Ministry funds and services for its functioning, its briefwas
officially "to consider and report upon the best medical measures forpreventing V.D.
in the civil community having regard to administrative practicalities as well as costs".
Itwasin reality, though, anelaboratedevicetoensurethatthetwo societiescouldmeet
in an adjudicated conference without committing the Ministry to any particular
outcome. In the meantime the NCCVD had been given notice that its grant was to be
reducedby£1,000(from £15,000) for 1922 and thatthefollowingyearthegrantwould
befurthercutbyathird. ThenewsofthiswasgreetedbytheSPVDasaclearindication
that they were likely to receive the balance of the funds.
With a further change of Minister (N. Chamberlain) at the time when Trevethin
delivered thecommittee's report, Newmanhad thechance topresentitsconclusionsin
the context of the Department's own orthodoxy. The Minister met the General
Secretary oftheNCCVD beforethepublication ofthe report'sconclusions so that the
NCCVD should have an informed and immediate press release on the report; no such
similar arrangements were made with the SPVD.
The report did not solve any of the differences between the societies and its very
ambiguityoffindingsallowedeachtoclaimthatitsanctionedtheirownpolicy. Thekey
elements here are paragraphs 14 and 32; early disinfection was acknowledged as
effective but rejected on the grounds as being the least effective basis for a venereal
disease programme on costs grounds; disinfection was endorsed as part ofa general
treatment programme, not a preventive programme. Disinfectants were therefore
allowed to be sold by chemists but not advertised.
Newmanquicklyspotted theambiguity and advised the NCCVD to be mostcareful
in endorsing the report. However, under the influence of The Times and the British
Medical Journal the two societies accepted the report publicly and so put an end to
what The Timescalled an "unedifyingwrangle". Itwasaclearpublicpapering-over of
the division, and almost immediately the SPVD sought to enhance its position by
petitioning for a grant equal to that given to the NCCVD. But on this matter
Chamberlain was firm that no funds should be made available until there was clear
evidence that the two societies were co-operating. The actual policy and programmes
that such ajoint venture mightproduce was neverseriouslyconsidered by anyone; the
prospective grant was only an incentive to publicly decorous behaviour.
The NCCVD, rather than defending its historic right to funds, went on aggressively
to petition for additional funding in order to carry out the "new" propaganda work
recommended by Trevethin, and forecast its expenditure at £58,000 for 1924.53
52 Ibid.
53 PRO. MH55/191. NCCVD letter to Minister, 11 December 1923.
84Venereal disease and the prophylaxis dilemma 1916-1926
Newman sustained the line of the Minister and refused to give any additional
fundsuntil therewasevidence ofunitedwork between the societies; butthis holdingof
the funds did not secure unity as Wansey Bayly (Secretary to the SPVD) records in his
memoirs, insteadtherec were inconclusive meetings whoseminuteshadconstantly tobe
censored: ". . . During thediscourses, itemerged that theNCCVD were notin reality
free agents, or an independent organisation but were in effect the propaganda
department ofthe M.O.H. in regard to V.D. One prominent member ofthe NCCVD
said, 'We get£7,000 a yearfrom the M.O.H. and ifitcomes to throwingover£7,000 or
disinfection, we shall throw over disinfection'."54
In July 1924 Sir Auckland Geddes took over the presidency ofthe SPVD, and it was
hoped in Whitehall that he would manage to reconcile the two societies and preside
overthem both. Part ofthe deal involved aradicalchangebytheNCCVD which wasto
endorse disinfection as prophylaxis, notjust as treatment, and to embody this in their
propaganda.
The NCCVD were naturally confused, since Geddes was presented to them as a
president of whom the department approved although his own inclinations were
contrary to the policies defended by the Ministry of Health. A memorandum from
Newman to the Minister demonstrated the ambiguity of the NCCVD's position; he
pointed out that the NCCVD wanted to change their policy in order to meet Geddes
and so make the amalgamation ofthe two societies possible, but they were fearful that
this would alienate them from the department. Newman himselfprovided no comfort,
repeating the orthodoxy that the department would not pay for propaganda on
disinfection.55 At the same time he noted with reliefto the Minister (Chamberlain) that
public interest in venereal disease as reflected in the press was declining, as was the
incidence of it. His policy of manipulation for inaction and quietude was apparently
successful.56
The NCCVD solved its major problems of change of policy and presidency by a
change of name, in 1925 it became the British Social Hygiene Council. Although it
publicly claimed that it would not be any the less concerned with venereal disease, it
was apparentthatthe society was interested in developing other areas ofeducation and
propaganda and hoped to attract further government support for this. The theme of
social hygiene was also wide enough to include the co-option of many smaller
associations and societies involved in health promotion and education. It was also a
theme which appealed directly to the racist beliefs of many of the SPVD members,
since the emphasis of the education programme was on the sponsorship of a racial
conscience, and a "pride ofrace".57 The themes ofrace and hygiene by 1925 had begun
to replace class and morality as dominant values in health education.58 The BSHC
54 Bayly, op. cit., note 36 above.
55 PRO. MH55/191. Newman to Robinson, 23 January 1925.
56 PRO. MH55/191. CMO (Newman) memo to Minister, 2 February 1925.
57 C. J. Bond, 'British Social Hygiene Council', Br. med J., 1925, ii: 88: "It is even more important to
arouse in the minds ofthe people a racial conscience, a pride ofrace which willenable an enlightened public
opinion to focus its attention."
58 The themes of race and hygiene during the 1920s and 1930s that dominated the international social
hygienemovements requireconsiderable explication and will be followed up in a sequel paper; some idea of
this theme can be found inG. Harpham, 'Time running out: the Edwardiansense ofculturaldegeneration',
Clio V, 1976, no. 3, pp. 283-301. The relationship of class and morality in health education historically is
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enjoyed a briefperiod ofpopularity and sponsorship from the Ministry ofHealth but
eventually fell to the same internal politics which obliterated the SPVD, although that
was in 1942 and by that time Newman had finally gone.
SUMMARY
The theme ofprophylaxis in venereal disease policies much preoccupied the health
educationalists and propagandists for the decade 1916-1926. It has often been
characterized as a dispute between moralists and medics. However, it turns on a far
more complicated division ofinterests. The early propagandists opposed any form of
regulationist policies whichwere seen as aform ofmorals policing, an invasion ofcivil
rightsanddiscriminatingunfairlyagainstwomen. Themilitarydevelopedapolicythat
wasamixture ofextremelaissez-faire and severe regulation, theywereclearly opposed
to any form ofmoral education which they saw as either useless or a serious threat to
morale. Army doctors, taking their service experience into civilian life seriously
questioned a policy which prevented them from using techniques which they knew to
beeffective. Thissituation broughtintobeingthe SPVDwhich insupportingtheuseof
prophylactics challenged the educational approach, the orthodoxy supported by the
NCCVD.
As the NCCVD became more intransigent, so the SPVD more openly defended
prophylaxis as the priority venereal disease control. If some doctors were willing to
defendtheuseofchemical treatmentsand tobelittlethemoralemphasisinmuchofthe
NCCVD propaganda, they were often less enthusiastic about sponsoring a system of
self-medication which allowed the medical practitioner to be by-passed. The SPVD
always had a lingering retinue ofdoctors who demanded that the disinfectant scheme
should be operated with the involvement ofdoctors, and packets prescribed solely by
practitioners. Doctors were keen that health educationalists and their propaganda
should place the medical practitioner as the focal point in anycampaign, and the field
of venereal disease was seen as important in stimulating the development of the
speciality ofvenereology. Doctors did not welcome the extension ofself-referrals to
local authority clinics, since that again diminished the role of the practitioner.
Sir B. Blackett, presidentoftheBSHC,writing to Robinson in 1932ontheproblems
surrounding health education during the 1920s, pointed out that those who argued in
favour ofthe individual always paying for his treatment and medical services did give
credence to the accusation that the medical profession had a vested interest in disease
which consciously or unconsciously obstructed progress in preventive medicine. He
cited anexample ofthistendencyfrom an article in theLancet(4June 1932) inwhicha
doctor claimed that people were going to free venereal diseaseclinics when theycould
infactaffordto goprivately, hencevenereal specialistswerelosingout. Thatthisquote
cannot be seen as atypical is endorsed by a note made by Robinson on it; "it is here of
course thatprogress on thepreventivesidefindsachiefenemy".59 Areplyin theLancet
ofthe next week went on to argue that a practitioner who devotes himselfto new kinds
considered in thecontext ofthe Medical Department ofthe BoardofEducation by0. Musgrave, 'Morality
and the Medical Department 1907-1974', Br. J. Educ. Stud, 1977, 25: no. 2.
59 PRO. MH55/2. Paper submitted by Blackett to Robinson, 4July 1932, 'A layman'splea forapositive
health policy'.
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ofpreventive work "finds himselfunder suspicion from his fellows who consciously or
unconsciously feel their incomes threatened".60
The Ministry ofHealth establishment wanted propaganda and educational services
to be tailored to the existing administrative structure and did not want to become
involvedinanycontentiousissuesaboutsexualmores, orcreatenewprecedents ofself-
diagnosis orself-prescription. Manyofthedoctorsinthe Ministry ofHealth feltthat if
the government licensed self-medication it would be interposing itselfbetween doctor
andpatient andinfringingclinicaljudgment. Onthe otherhand theMinistry ofHealth
was concerned that this area ofpublic health should be as efficient and economical as
other sectors of the public health services. The NCCVD enjoyed a favoured style
pressure group relationship with the government during this period and consolidated
its position in a particular field ofhealth education and propaganda to such an extent
that it was able to expand into new and wider areas and receive substantial support
long after its initial basis for organization had disappeared.
The SPVD on the other hand failed to compete successfully as a pressure group; it
never managed to penetrate the Ministry ofHealth establishment, and it was severely
handicapped bythecombined hostilityoftheChiefMedicalOfficerandthepermanent
secretary totheDepartment. Despite itspubliccampaign inthepressandparliament it
neversecuredthelegitimacyofbeingagovernment-sanctioned educational agencyand
therefore never obtained guaranteed funds oraccess into thepolicy-making process at
Whitehall.
60 PRO. MH55/2. Marginal note by Robinson on Blackett's paper.
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